A model of choice from lists by Rubinstein, Ariel & Salant, Yuval
Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 3–17 1555-7561/20060003
A model of choice from lists
ARIEL RUBINSTEIN
School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, and Department of Economics, New York University
YUVAL SALANT
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
The standard economic choice model assumes that the decision maker chooses
from sets of alternatives. In contrast, we analyze a choice model in which the de-
cision maker encounters the alternatives in the form of a list. We present two
axioms similar in nature to the classical axioms of choice from sets. We show that
they characterize all the choice functions from lists that involve the choice of ei-
ther the ﬁrst or the last optimal alternative in the list according to some prefer-
ence relation. We then relate choice functions from lists to the classical notions of
choice correspondences and random choice functions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The standard economic choice model assumes that decision makers choose from sets.
However, it is often the case that the decision maker encounters the alternatives in the
form of a list. The list may be physical, in the sense that the elements of the choice
problem are presented to the decision maker sequentially along some dimension such
as time or space. For example, when looking for a job, the decision maker receives offers
one after the other or when purchasing a product online, the alternatives are listed from
left to right or top to bottom. The list may also be virtual, in the sense that the alterna-
tives come to the decision maker’s mind in some order. For example, this might occur
when a researcher chooses a research topic or when he chooses a journal to submit a
paper to. The researcher typically does not have a comprehensive set of alternatives
in front of him; rather, the alternatives come to his mind in some sequential manner.
Whether the list is physical or virtual, it appears that the order in which the decision
maker encounters the alternatives may be a substantive factor affecting his choice.
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Indeed, a variety of cognitive and procedural effects suggest that choice is order-
dependent. A primacy effect gives advantage to the ﬁrst few alternatives in a list since
people examine them more attentively. A recency effect emerges due to the fact that
people recall more vividly alternatives that appear at the end of a list, a factor that gives
advantage to the last few alternatives in a list. In other cases, decision makers pay spe-
cial attention to alternatives that stand out relative to their neighbors in the list. For
example, a low-priced item will draw special attention if it is surrounded by high-priced
items. In addition, the ﬁrst element in a list may serve as a reference point to which sub-
sequent alternatives are compared (see Tversky and Kahneman 1991) and thus choice
may depend on the element that appears ﬁrst. For example, if the items in a list differ
in quality, then that of the ﬁrst item may serve as a benchmark to which the quality of
subsequent items is compared. Experimental scientists are aware of the sensitivity of
choice to the order of presentation and hence the common practice of presenting alter-
nativestoparticipantsindifferentorderings. Someexperimentalandempiricalﬁndings
that relate to order-of-presentation effects are surveyed in Section 7.
In what follows we present a model of choice from lists and conduct a basic inves-
tigation of the model. Our analysis will follow that of the model of choice from sets
conducted in Choice Theory.
We explore choice functions from lists. A list is a sequence of distinct elements of
a ﬁnite “grand” set X. A choice function from lists singles out one element from ev-
ery list. We discuss two properties of choice functions from lists. The ﬁrst property is
Partition Independence (PI), which states that dividing a list arbitrarily into several sub-
lists, choosing from each sublist and then choosing from the list of chosen elements,
yields the same result as choosing from the original list. The second property is List
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, which states that omitting unchosen elements
from a list does not alter the choice. We show the equivalence of these two properties
and prove that they characterize a particular class of choice functions from lists. In this
class, each function is parameterized by a preference relation ¥ over X and a labelling of
every ¥-indifference set by “First” or “Last”. Given a list, the function identiﬁes the set
of ¥-maximal elements within the list and chooses the ﬁrst or the last element among
them according to the label of the ¥-indifference set they belong to. This class natu-
rally generalizes the class of preference maximizing procedures in the context of choice
functions from sets.
We then extend the discussion to cases where the order of the elements in the list
is not directly observable, such as when the list is virtual. Under these circumstances,
it seems reasonable to analyze choice correspondences, which attach to every set of
alternatives all the elements that are chosen for some ordering of that set. We show that
choice functions from lists that satisfy PI induce choice correspondences that satisfy
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Conversely, if one starts with a choice
correspondencethatsatisﬁesWARP,itcanbe“explained”byachoicefunctionfromlists
thatsatisﬁesPI.Thus,themodelofchoicefromlistsprovidesanewinterpretationofthe
notion of choice correspondences.
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from lists generated from sets by a random process. If we do not observe the actual or-
der of the elements, yet we have access to “many” of the decision maker’s choices, we
can summarize his choices by a random choice function. A random choice function
assigns to every set of alternatives a probability measure over the set where the proba-
bility of an element is the likelihood that it will be chosen from the set. We show that a
choice function from lists satisﬁes PI if and only if the induced random choice function
is monotone in the sense that the probability of choosing an element from a set weakly
increases when the set of available alternatives shrinks.
While our notion of a list does not allow duplication of elements in a given list, we
will show toward the end of the paper that some of the results carry over to the case
where repetition of elements in a list is allowed.
2. THE MODEL AND EXAMPLES
Let X be a ﬁnite set of N elements. A list is a non-empty ﬁnite sequence of distinct
elements of X. Let L be the set of all lists. A choice function from lists D : L → X
is a function that assigns to every list L = (a1,...,aK), a single element D(L) from the
set {a1,...,aK}. We abbreviate and write D(a1,...,aK) instead of D((a1,...,aK)). Note
that our formulation excludes lists in which an element appears more than once. In
Section 6, we relax this assumption and investigate a model in which alternatives can
appear multiple times in a list.
To demonstrate the richness of the framework and motivate the analysis to follow,
we describe below several examples of families of choice functions from lists.
EXAMPLE 1 (Rational choice). The decision maker has a strict preference relation (i.e.,
complete, asymmetric and transitive)  over X and chooses the -best element from
every list. ◊
EXAMPLE 2 (Satisﬁcing (Simon 1955)). The decision maker has a strict preference rela-
tion  over X and a satisfactory threshold a∗ ∈X. He chooses the ﬁrst element in the list
that is not inferior to a∗; if there is none he chooses the last element in the list. ◊
EXAMPLE 3 (Place-dependent rationality). Thedecisionmakerhasapreferencerelation
overthesetX×{1,2,...,N}with(x,k)interpretedasthealternativex inthek-thplace
of a list. From the list (a1,...,aK) the decision maker chooses the alternative ak for
which (ak,k)  (al,l ) for all 1 ≤ l ≤ K, l 6= k. Thus, the decision maker is “rational” but
treats the alternative x at one position differently than at another position. This could
occur, for example, when the position of an element in a list reﬂects the popularity or
the relevance of the alternative (e.g., when the alternatives are the results returned by a
search engine) and thus conveys information about its quality. ◊
EXAMPLE 4 (The ﬁrst element dictates the ordering). The ﬁrst element in the list serves
as a reference point (see Tversky and Kahneman 1991) according to which the decision
maker evaluates the alternatives. Formally, for every element a ∈ X there is a corre-
sponding ordering a of X such that D(a1,...,aK) is the a1-best element in the set6 Rubinstein and Salant Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
{a1,...,aK}. For example, given a distance function on X, let x a y if x is more distant
from a than y. Then, D chooses from every list the element that is farthest from the ﬁrst
element in the list. ◊
EXAMPLE 5 (Successive choice (Salant 2003)). The primitive of this choice procedure is
a binary relation R over X, where x R y is interpreted as “x rejects y”. Given a list L =
(a1,...,aK), the decision maker stores a1 in a “register”; at stage t of the computation,
1 ≤ t < K, the decision maker replaces the register value y with at+1 if at+1 R y. When
the list ends the decision maker chooses the alternative in the register. For example, let
u : X → R be a utility function and s : X → R+ be a “bias” function. We say that x R y if
u(x)>u(y)+s(y). In this case, when comparing a new alternativex to the one stored in
the register y, the decision maker adds a “bonus” s(y) to the alternative in the register. ◊
EXAMPLE 6 (Stop when you start to decline). The decision maker has an ordering  on
X. He chooses the element ak where k is the maximal integer such that a1 ≺ a2 ≺ ··· ≺
ak−1 ≺ ak; that is, the decision maker goes through the alternatives according to the
order of the list and stops the process on the ﬁrst occasion that the value declines. ◊
EXAMPLE 7 (Contrast effect). The decision maker classiﬁes the elements of X into two
classes: “good” and “bad”. A good element appears to be even better the greater the
number of bad elements that surround it. The decision maker chooses a good element
that is surrounded by the largest number of consecutive bad elements. ◊
EXAMPLE 8 (Knockout tournament). Let → be a tournament, that is, a complete asym-
metric binary relation on X. The choice from the list (a1,...,aK) is calculated in rounds.
In the ﬁrst round, the decision maker matches a2k−1 and a2k for 1 ≤ k ≤ b
1
2Kc. The
“winner” in each match is the alternative that beats the other according to the relation
→. For the case that K is odd, the unmatched alternative aK is considered a winner
as well. The decision maker continues to the next round with a list that contains the
“winners” of the ﬁrst round ordered like the original list. The process continues until all
alternatives besides one are eliminated. ◊
EXAMPLE 9 (A “pseudo-random” function). Let  be an ordering over X, let (a1,...,aK)
be a list, and let nK = blog2Kc. For 1 ≤ i ≤ nK, deﬁne "i = 1 if ai  ai+1 and "i = 0 if
ai ≺ ai+1. The decision maker chooses the element ak where k is the nK-digit binary
number "1"2···"nK . We call this function pseudo-random because the chosen element
is picked by what seems to be an arbitrary criterion and the choice is sensitive to any
permutation of adjacent elements at the beginning of the list. ◊
3. AXIOMS
In this section we explore a few axioms regarding choice functions from lists. Denote
by S(L) the set of all the elements in a list L, that is, S(a1,...,aK) = {a1,...,aK}. We say
that the lists L1 and L2 are disjoint if S(L1)∩S(L2) = ;. For any m lists L1, ..., Lm thatTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) A model of choice from lists 7
are pairwise disjoint, deﬁne 〈L1,...,Lm〉 to be the list that is the concatenation of the m
lists.
Partition Independence (PI): We say that a choice function from lists D satisﬁes prop-
erty PI if for every pair of disjoint lists, L1,L2 ∈L , we have
D(〈L1,L2〉)=D(D(L1),D(L2)).
The property PI requires that a decision maker chooses the same element from the
list whether
(i) he chooses from the list as a whole, or
(ii) he partitions the list into two sublists, chooses from each sublist, and then makes
a choice from the two-element list of chosen elements.
Note that if a choice function D satisﬁes PI, then for every list (a1,...,aK) we have
D(a1,...,aK) = D(D(...D(D(a1,a2),a3),...,aK−1),aK). That is, D(a1,...,aK) can be
computed by K − 1 operations of the function D over pairs as follows. Start by com-
puting D(a1,a2), then compare the “winner” with a3 to obtain D(D(a1,a2),a3) and so
on, until D(...,aK−1) is compared with aK to obtain the chosen element. This means
that every choice function that satisﬁes PI is a successive choice function (see Exam-
ple 5 in Section 2). However, it will follow from the proof of Proposition 2 that not every
successive choice function satisﬁes PI.
ListIndependenceofIrrelevantAlternatives(LIIA): Wesaythatachoicefunctionfrom
lists D satisﬁes property LIIA if for every list (a1,...,aK),
D(a1,...,aK)=ai ⇒D(a1,...,a j−1,a j+1,...,aK)=ai
for all 1≤ j ≤ K, j 6=i. In other words, deleting an element that is not chosen from
a list does not alter the choice.
TheabovetwopropertiesarecloseinspirittoAxiom1inPlott(1973)andthefamiliar
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom in the context of choice from sets. Our
ﬁrst result establishes the equivalence between the two axioms.
PROPOSITION 1. D satisﬁes LIIA if and only if it satisﬁes PI.
PROOF. Assume D satisﬁes LIIA. Let L = 〈L1,L2〉. Let a = D(L) and assume w.l.o.g.
that a ∈ L2. Both L2 and (D(L1),a) are sublists of L that include a and hence, by LIIA,
D(L2)=a and D(D(L1),a)=a. Consequently,
D(〈L1,L2〉)=D(L)=a =D(D(L1),a)=D(D(L1),D(L2)).
In the other direction, assume D satisﬁes PI and let D(a1,...,aK) = ai. We need
to show that D(a1,...,a j−1,a j+1,...,aK) = ai, where w.l.o.g. we assume that j > i. By8 Rubinstein and Salant Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
PI, for every h ≥ i we have ai = D(a1,...,aK) = D(D(a1,...,ah),D(ah+1,...,aK)). Thus
D(a1,...,ah)=ai and D(ai,D(ah+1,...,aK))=ai. Therefore
D(a1,...,a j−1,a j+1,...,aK)=D(D(a1,...,a j−1),D(a j+1,...,aK))
=D(ai,D(a j+1,...,aK))
=ai. 
We now derive the main result of this section. Recall that in the context of choice
functions from sets, the requirement that C(A) =C({C(A1),C(A2)}), for every choice set
A and its partition into A1 and A2, characterizes all the choice functions that maximize
some strict preference relation over X. We show that a choice function from lists that
satisﬁes PI can be rationalized as the result of maximizing a weak preference relation
over X, where indifferences are resolved on a list-position basis, i.e. either the ﬁrst or
the last maximizer is chosen. In the context of an employer who wishes to hire a worker
from a list of candidates, this form of rationalization would ﬁt a practice by which all
candidates are graded and the employer chooses the candidate with the highest grade.
In the case of multiple candidates with the same highest grade, the employer chooses
either the ﬁrst or the last among them according to list position (e.g. the candidate that
applied to the job ﬁrst or was interviewed last). Thus, to be consistent with PI, a choice
function from lists can use the order in the list to break ties only in a very particular way.
Formally, let ¥ be a preferencerelation over X and let δ :X →{1,2} be a functionsat-
isfying δ(x) = δ(y) whenever x ∼ y. We refer to δ as a priority indicator. We denote by
D¥,δ the choice function that chooses from every list L the ﬁrst (or the last) ¥-maximal
element according to whether the δ-value of the set of ¥-maximal elements inS(L) is 1
(or2). Obviously,if¥isastrictrelation,thentheresultingchoicefunctionisrational(Ex-
ample 1). In addition, any satisﬁcing choice function D (Example 2) can be represented
as D = D¥,δ by having ¥ induce two indifference sets of satisfactory and unsatisfactory
elements, and having the δ-value of the satisfactory and unsatisfactory elements be 1
and 2, respectively.
PROPOSITION 2. A choice function from lists D satisﬁes PI if and only if there exists a
uniquepreferencerelation¥over X andauniquepriorityindicator δ suchthat D =D¥,δ.
REMARK. InSection6,weextendProposition2tothecasewherealternativescanappear
multiple times in a list.
PROOF. It is easy to verify that any choice function D¥,δ satisﬁes PI.
Intheotherdirection,letD beachoicefunctionfromliststhatsatisﬁesPI.ByPropo-
sition 1, D also satisﬁes LIIA. For every a, b ∈X we deﬁne:
(i) a b if D(a,b)=D(b,a)=a,
(ii) a ∼1 b if D(a,b)=a and D(b,a)=b, and
(iii) a ∼2 b if D(a,b)=b and D(b,a)=a.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) A model of choice from lists 9
For every a, b ∈ X exactly one the following relations holds: a  b, b  a, a ∼1 b or
a ∼2 b. Therefore,  is asymmetric. By deﬁnition, ∼1 and ∼2 are symmetric.
Let us go through the following series of simple claims.
CLAIM 1. The relation  is transitive.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Assume a b and b c. By PI we have D(a,b,c)=D(a,D(b,c))=a
and by LIIA we have D(a,c) = a. Using the same reasoning, we also have D(c,b,a) = a
and D(c,a)=a. Thus, a c.
CLAIM 2. The relations ∼1 and ∼2 are transitive.
PROOF OF CLAIM. We prove the claim for ∼1 (a similar proof can be made for ∼2). As-
sume that a ∼1 b and b ∼1 c. By PI, D(a,b,c) = a and D(c,b,a) = c. Therefore, by LIIA
we have D(a,c)=a and D(c,a)=c. Thus, a ∼1 c.
CLAIM 3. (i) If a b and b ∼1 c, then a c.
(ii) If a ∼1 b and b c, then a c.
(iii) If a ∼2 b and b c, then a c.
(iv) If a b and b ∼2 c, then a c.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Let us prove (i). Assume a  b and b ∼1 c . Then, by PI we have
D(a,b,c)=D(a,D(b,c))=a and D(b,c,a)=D(D(b,c),a)=a. Hence, by LIIA, D(a,c)=
D(c,a)=a and thus a c. The other parts of the claim are proved in a similar way.
CLAIM 4. It is impossible to have both a ∼1 b and b ∼2 c.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Assume to the contrary that a ∼1 b and b ∼2 c. We cannot have
a ∼1 c since the symmetry and transitivity of ∼1 (see Claim 2) would then imply that
b ∼1 c, which is a contradiction to b ∼2 c. Similarly, it is impossible that a ∼2 c. By
Claim 3, neither a  c nor c  a is true. Thus, a and c do not relate to each other by
either , ∼1 or ∼2, which is a contradiction.
Let us deﬁne a ¥ b if a  b or a ∼1 b or a ∼2 b. By the above claims, the binary
relation ¥ is a preference relation (transitive and complete). If a ∼ b (namely, both
a ¥ b and b ¥ a), then either a ∼1 b or a ∼2 b. By Claim 4, every ¥-indifference set,
I ⊆ X, is characterized by the fact that all its members relate to each other by either ∼1
or ∼2 (but not both). If all the members of I are related by ∼1, we deﬁne δ(a) = 1 for all
a ∈ I; otherwise, we deﬁne δ(a)=2.
Let L =(a1,...,aK) be a list and denote D(L)=ai. By LIIA we have ai =D(ai,a j) for
every j >i and ai =D(a j,ai) for every j <i. Thus, ai is a ¥-maximal element ofS(L). If
thereismorethanone¥-maximalelement,thenbyLIIAtheelementD(L)isalsochosen
from the list L∗ that is obtained from L by eliminating all the non ¥-maximal elements.10 Rubinstein and Salant Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Since all the members in S(L∗) have the same δ-value, by applying PI we obtain that
D(L∗) is either the ﬁrst or the last element in L∗ according to the δ-value of the elements
in L∗. Thus, D(L) = D(L∗) is also the ﬁrst or the last ¥-maximal element in L which
means that D =D¥,δ.
Finally, the preference relation and the priority indicator are unique since (¥,δ) 6=
(¥0,δ0) implies that D¥,δ 6=D¥0,δ0. 
A choice function from lists is rationalizable if there exists a strict preference rela-
tion  over X such that for any list L, D(L)  a0 for all a0 ∈ S(L)\{D(L)}. Of course, a
choice function characterized by Proposition 2 is rationalizable if and only if it satisﬁes
the following property.
Order Invariance (OI): We say that a choice function D satisﬁes property OI if
D(a1,a2,...,aK)=D(aσ(1),aσ(2),...,aσ(K)) for any list (a1,a2,...,aK) and any per-
mutation σ of {1,...,K}.
4. CHOICE CORRESPONDENCES
Theliteraturedistinguishesbetweenchoicefunctionsthatassignasingleelementtoev-
ery choice set and choice correspondences that assign to every choice set a non-empty
subset (not necessarily a singleton) of elements. If choice is sensitive to order, one may
be interested in choice correspondences that attach to every set of alternatives all the
elements that are chosen for some ordering of that set. One might interpret such choice
correspondences as a summary of the information available to a researcher who knows
that the decision maker chooses from lists although he does not observe the order of
the elements. For example, when a student chooses a graduate school, it may be the
case that the set of available schools is known to an observer though the actual order in
which the student evaluates the different schools is unobserved.
Formally, given a set A and an ordering O of X, let L(A,O) be the list in which the
elements of A are ordered according toO. Let D be a choice function from lists. Deﬁne
the induced choice correspondence CD by
CD(A)={ a | there exists an orderingO for which D(L(A,O))=a}.
Our aim is to connect between the properties of a given choice function from lists D
and the induced choice correspondence CD. The following proposition links the prop-
erty of Partition Independence in the context of choice from lists to the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (WARP) in the context of choice correspondences. (A choice cor-
respondence C satisﬁes WARP if for every A, B ⊆ X, and a, b ∈ A ∩ B, if a ∈ C(A) and
b ∈C(B), then a ∈C(B).)
PROPOSITION 3. (i)Let D beachoicefunctionfromlists. If D satisﬁesPI,thenCD satisﬁes
WARP.(ii)Let C beachoicecorrespondence. If C satisﬁesWARP,thenthereexistsachoice
function from lists D that satisﬁes PI, such that CD =C.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) A model of choice from lists 11
PROOF. (i) Assume D satisﬁes PI. By Proposition 2, D = D¥,δ for some preference rela-
tion¥andapriorityindicatorδ. FixtwosetsA, B ⊆X andtwoelementsa,b ∈A∩B. Let
a ∈CD(A) and b ∈CD(B). We need to show that a ∈CD(B). Since a ∈CD(A), it belongs
to the set of ¥-maximizers in A, which means that a ¥ b. Since b ∈ CD(B), b belongs
to the set of ¥-maximizers in B. Thus, a ∼ b and both are ¥-maximizers in B. Assume
w.l.o.g. that δ(a)=δ(b)=1. LetOa be an ordering that lists a ﬁrst. Then D(L(B,Oa))=a
and therefore a ∈CD(B).
(ii) It is well established that if a choice correspondenceC is deﬁned over all subsets
ofX ofuptothreeelementsandsatisﬁesWARP,thenthereexistsapreferencerelation¥
over X such that for every set A ⊆X,C(A) is the set of ¥-maximizers in A (see Mas-Colell
et al. 1995, Chapter 1). Let ¥ denote this preference relation and let D = D¥,δ, where
δ(x)=1forallx ∈X. Then, D satisﬁesPI.LetA ⊆X. WeneedtoshowthatC(A)=CD(A).
If a ∈C(A), then by deﬁnition D(L(A,Oa)) = a and thus a ∈CD(A). If a / ∈C(A), then a is
not a ¥-maximizer in A and there exists no ordering O for which D(L(A,O)) = a. Thus,
a / ∈CD(A). 
5. RANDOM CHOICE FUNCTIONS
In some cases, an individual’s choice from a set lacks consistency, yet we observe that
his choice has a systematic random description. For example, when choosing between
twowines,itmaybethecasethatthedecisionmakerchooseseachwinehalfofthetime.
In this case, we wish to assign probabilities to the different elements in the choice set,
where the probability of an element is the likelihood that this element will be chosen
from the given set. Formally, a random choice function C is a function that assigns to
every set of alternatives A ⊆ X a probability measure over A. We denote by C(A)(a) the
probability of choosing the alternative a from the set A.
An intuitive reason for randomness in choice from sets is that although the decision
maker deterministically chooses from lists, there is an underlying random process that
transforms sets into lists. For example, a consumer who wishes to purchase a camera
might arbitrarily access one of several online retailers (e.g. according to the results of a
search engine or the advice of a friend), who offer the same group of cameras, but list
them in a different order.
Formally,letµbeaprobabilitymeasureoverthesetoforderingsofX. Givenachoice






Underlying the deﬁnition of C
µ
D is the assumption that the order by which alternatives
are listed is independent of the set A. Of course, if D is invariant to the ordering of the
alternatives, then C
µ
D(A) is concentrated on only one element of A.
In this section, we deﬁne two properties of random choice functions and connect
them to the corresponding properties of choice functions from lists. The ﬁrst can be
traced back to Luce and Suppes (1965) (see also Tversky 1972 and Simonson and Tver-
sky 1992). We say that a random choice function C is monotone if for every two sets
A and A0 such that A0 ⊆ A and for every element a ∈ A0, we have C(A)(a) ≤ C(A0)(a).12 Rubinstein and Salant Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
That is, the probability of an element being chosen can only increase when the set of
available alternatives shrinks. While the monotonicity property appears to be robust,
our experimental results in Section 7 hint that it can be violated in quite a reasonable
setting.
We ﬁrst characterize all choice functions from lists for which the induced random
choice function is monotone for every probability measure over the set of orderings.
PROPOSITION 4. Let D be a choice function from lists. Then D satisﬁes PI if and only if for
every probability measure µ, C
µ
D is monotone.
PROOF. Assume D satisﬁes PI and hence D = D¥,δ for some preference relation ¥ and
some priority indicator δ. Let A and A0 be two sets such that A0 ⊆ A ⊆ X, and let a ∈ A0.
Let µ be a probability measure on the set of all orderings. For every orderingO, L(A0,O)
is a sublist of L(A,O) and hence if D¥,δ(L(A,O)) = a then D¥,δ(L(A0,O)) = a. Therefore,





In the other direction, assume that for every degenerate probability measure µ (that
is, a measure that assigns probability 1 to a single ordering) C
µ
D is monotone. By Propo-
sition 1, we need to show that D satisﬁes LIIA. Let L = (a1,...,aK) be a list and L0 be a
sublist of L containing a = D(L). Let µ be the probability measure that assigns proba-
bility 1 to an orderingO in which ai O ai+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K −1 (where ai O ai+1 means









D(S(L0))(a) and thus C
µ
D(S(L0))(a) = 1
which means that D(L0)=a. 
The secondproperty of randomchoicefunctions that weinvestigate is thepreserva-
tion of inequalities. We say that a random choice function C preserves inequalities if for
any set A ⊆X and for every a, b ∈A, either
(i) C(A)(a)=C(A)(b)=0 or
(ii) C(A)(a)≥C(A)(b) if and only if C({a,b})(a)≥C({a,b})(b).
For example, Luce (1959) presents a family of random choice functions Cu(A)(a) =
u(a)/
P
y∈A u(y), each indexed by a function u : X → [0,1], that preserve inequalities.
Tversky (1972), on the other hand, considers examples in which the preserving inequal-
ities assumption is unlikely to hold. We now characterize all the choice functions from
lists whose induced random choice functions preserve inequalities for every probability
measure.
PROPOSITION 5. Let D be a choice function from lists. Then D = D¥,δ for some prefer-
ence relation ¥ with at most two elements in every indifference set and for some priority
indicator δ if and only if C
µ
D preserves inequalities for all probability measures µ.
PROOF. Let D = D¥,δ, where the preference relation ¥ has at most two elements in
every indifference set and let µ be a probability measure on the set of orderings of X.
Let A ⊆ X and a, b ∈ A such that a ¥b. If a is not a ¥-maximizer in A, then C
µ
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C
µ





D({a,b})(b)=0 and inequalities are preserved. If both a and b are ¥-
maximizers in A and δ(a) = δ(b) = 1 (and similarly for the case where δ(a) = δ(b) = 2),
then, since there are no other ¥-maximizers in A, D(L(A,O)) = D(L({a,b},O)) = a iff O









In the other direction, let D be a choice function such thatC
µ
D preserves inequalities
for all probability measures µ. We ﬁrst show that D satisﬁes LIIA. Otherwise, there exists
a list L and a sublist L0, such that D(L) ∈S(L0) but D(L) 6= D(L0). Then C
µ
D does not pre-
serve inequalities for the probability measure that assigns probability 1 to an ordering
O that satisﬁes L(S(L),O) = L (that is, O orders the elements of S(L) as they are listed in
L). Thus, by Propositions 1 and 2, D = D¥,δ for some preference relation ¥ and some
priority indicator δ. It remains to show that each indifference set of ¥ contains at most
two elements. Assume that there are three elements a, b and c such that a ∼b ∼ c. Let
µ be a probability measure that assigns a probability of
1
2 to each of two orderings O1










for every x ∈{a,b,c}, but since µ has a support of only two orderings, it assigns positive
probabilities to at most two elements, which is a contradiction. 
6. DUPLICATION OF ALTERNATIVES
Throughout the paper we have focused on the possibility that the order in which alter-
natives appear might affect choice while assuming that all the elements in the list are
non-identical. It is possible, however, that the number of times an element appears in
the list also inﬂuences choice. For example, if the elements in the list represent adver-
tisements for various products, then not only the order of the advertisements but also
the number of times they are repeated might affect choice. In this section, we extend
the model of choice from lists to allow for the possibility that elements appear more
than once in a list.
Formally, we deﬁne a list to be any ﬁnite sequence of elements of X. We denote by
L ∗ the set of all lists and explore choice functions deﬁned over L ∗. The properties PI
and LIIA can be naturally extended to the new setting as follows.
Partition Independence (PI∗): We say that a choice function from lists D (deﬁned over
L ∗) satisﬁes property PI∗ if for every two lists, L1,L2 ∈L ∗, we have
D(〈L1,L2〉)=D(D(L1),D(L2)).
List Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (LIIA∗): We say that a choice function
from lists D (deﬁned over L ∗) satisﬁes property LIIA∗ if for every list L ∈ L ∗, if
a is chosen from L, then adding an instance of element b to L cannot lead to
choosing an element other than a or b.
Note that whereas PI and LIIA are equivalent (see Proposition 1) ,PI ∗ is not equiva-
lenttoLIIA∗. ItwillfollowfromProposition2∗ thatPI∗ impliesLIIA∗; however, LIIA∗ does14 Rubinstein and Salant Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
not imply PI∗. For example, let X ={a,b,c} and let D be a choice function that picks the
most frequent element in a list (if there is more than one such element, D chooses the
ﬁrst among them). Then, D satisﬁes LIIA∗ but
D(a,a,b,b,b,a,a,c,c,c)=a 6=D(b,c)=D(D(a,a,b,b,b),D(a,a,c,c,c)).
We now extend Proposition 2, which characterizes all the choice functions from lists
that satisfy PI, to the setting of choice functions from lists with duplication of alterna-
tives.
PROPOSITION 2∗. Achoicefunctionfromlists D (deﬁnedover L ∗)satisﬁes PI ∗ ifandonly
ifthereexistsapreferencerelation¥over X andapriorityindicator δ suchthat D =D¥,δ.
PROOF. We focus on the “only if” part of the proof. Let D be a choice function that
satisﬁes PI ∗. For a list L = (a1,...,aK) deﬁne dup(L) = K − |S(L)|. That is, dup(L) is
the maximal number of elements that can be deleted from L without changing the cor-
responding choice set S(L). By Proposition 2, there exists a preference relation ¥ and
a priority indicator δ such that D(L) = D¥,δ(L) for all lists L with dup(L) = 0. We will
show by induction on dup(L) that this continues to hold for any list. Indeed, assume
that D = D¥,δ for all lists L with dup(L) ≤ m. Let us show that D = D¥,δ for any list
L = (a1,...,aK) with dup(L) ≤ m + 1. Let ai = a j for some i < j. By PI∗ we have
D(L) = D(D(a1,...,ai),D(ai+1,...,aK)). By the induction assumption, x = D(a1,...,ai)
and y = D(ai+1,...,aK) are ¥-maximal, D(x,y) is a ¥-maximal element in {x,y}, and
therefore D(L) is a ¥-maximal element in S(L). Assume δ(D(L)) = 1 (an analogous ar-
gument can be made for δ(D(L)) = 2). If x ¥ y, then x is the ﬁrst ¥-maximal element
in L and hence D(L) = D(x,y) = D¥,δ(x,y) = x = D¥,δ(L). If y  x, then y is the ﬁrst
¥-maximal element in L and therefore D(L)=D(x,y)=D¥,δ(x,y)=y =D¥,δ(L). 
Proposition 2∗ implies that Proposition 3 continues to hold in the model with dupli-
cation of alternatives when we assume PI∗. Indeed, the proof of Proposition 3 uses only
the fact that the choice functions in question are characterized by a weak preference re-
lation and a priority indicator. This fact follows from PI∗ in the current setting, and from
PI in the previous setting. In addition, Proposition 2∗ implies that any choice function
that satisﬁes PI∗ and Order Invariance is rationalizable.
7. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
The idea that choice is sensitive to the order of presentation is well established in the
literature. Several empirical papers have reported on order effects in panel decisions
in contests such as the World Figure Skating Competition (Bruine de Bruin 2005), the
International Synchronized Swimming Competition (Wilson 1977), the Eurovision Song
Contest (Bruine de Bruin 2005) and the Queen Elisabeth Contest for violin and piano
(Glejser and Heyndels 2001). In these contests, the contestants appear sequentially and
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who receives the largest total number of points. It was found that the last few partic-
ipants in the contest have an advantage since judges tend to increase the points they
award over the course of the sequence.
The experimental literature also discusses order of presentation effects. For exam-
ple, Houston et al. (1989) and Houston and Sherman (1995) showed that when par-
ticipants have to choose between two sequentially presented options, they prefer the
second option in pairs where the alternatives share several negative features but have
unique positive features and prefer the ﬁrst alternative when the alternatives share sev-
eral positive features but have unique negative features.
Order effects are also common in strategic interactions. Rubinstein et al. (1996) in-
vestigated the behavior of players in a two-person game in which one player “hides”
a treasure in one of four places laid out in a row and the other player “seeks” it. They
found that both “hiders” and “seekers” favored middle positions over endpoints. Attali
and Bar-Hillel (2003) investigated a similar question in the context of multiple choice
tests. They found that “test makers and test takers have a strong and systematic ten-
dency for hiding the correct answers—or, respectively, for seeking them—in middle po-
sitions”. Christenfeld (1995) found that people tend to make a selection from the middle
when choosing a product from a grocery shelf, deciding which bathroom stall to use or
marking a box in a questionnaire.
LiuandSimonson(2005)examinedthebehaviorofsubjectswhowereaskedtomake
a choice from a list of ten products according to the following procedure (which is sim-
ilar to Example 5 in Section 2): First, a participant sees two products and has to decide
which one to keep as a possible choice for the future. In each of the next eight rounds
the participant is presented with an additional item and has to decide whether to keep
his choice from the previous round or to replace it with the new option. After seeing ten
options, participants are asked to decide whether they want to purchase the “winner”.
It turns out that among those that made a purchase, the ﬁrst and the second options on
the list were purchased by approximately 14% and 18% of the participants respectively.1
We conclude with our modest contribution to these experimental and empirical
ﬁndings. In many instances, the decision maker lacks the ability (due to time or cog-
nitive constraints) to evaluate all the alternatives and is forced to sample only a few of
them and to choose one of the sampled alternatives. The choice of the sampled options




is room for one more article in the next issue of the journal. Seven papers have already
survivedtheeditorialprocessandhavebeenrecommendedforpublicationinyourjour-
nal. The papers differ from each other in subject matter. Unfortunately, you have time
to read only three of the papers. Once you have read them, you will have to immediately
decide which paper to publish. The seven papers are numbered arbitrarily from 1 to 7.
Which three papers will you read?”
1Personal communication with Wendy Liu.16 Rubinstein and Salant Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Thefrequencieswithwhichthe131participantssampledthesevenoptionsarelisted
below:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
79% 61% 54% 39% 14% 20% 34%
And surprisingly about 83% of the subjects chose one of following eight responses
(which constitute 23% of the possible combinations):
1,2,3 1,4,7 2,4,6 2,5,7 1,4,6 1,3,7 1,3,6 2,4,7
39% 19% 6% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3%
Thus, approximately 40% of the participants in the experiment chose to sample the
ﬁrst three elements and almost 20% chose the triplet that consists of the ﬁrst, middle
and last elements. If this pattern extends to longer lists, one could interpret these re-
sults as suggesting that random choices violate the monotonicity property of random
choice functions, according to which the addition of an element to a choice problem
weakly decreases the probability that the other elements will be chosen. For example,
imagine that the alternatives are candidates who are always listed in alphabetical order
and that a decision maker samples three of them, evaluates them, and chooses one of
them. Assume that the decision maker’s choice following his evaluation is consistent
with the maximization of a ﬁxed ordering over the candidates, and that the ﬁfth person
in alphabetical order is the best candidate according to this ordering. If the list contains
the ﬁrst seven candidates in alphabetical order, candidate 5 will be sampled with very
low probability and hence will probably not be chosen. On the other hand, if the set of
candidates is extended to include nine candidates, it appears more likely (according to
the results of our experiment) that candidate 5, who is now at the center of the list, will
be picked for the sample and thus will have a higher probability of being chosen. This
contradicts the monotonicity property.
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